This paper uses a principal-agent model to study the design of randomized controlled experiments when outcomes depend on the subjects' (agents') effort. We show that, in this environment, selective trials which allow agents to select their likelihood of treatment generate greater information than standard randomized controlled trials. The nature of the additional information generated by selective trials depends on the choice problems offered to the agents. Open selective trials, where agents choose between lotteries with openly disclosed outcomes, identify marginal treatment effects (MTEs: Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005). Blind trials, where agents choose between lotteries with undisclosed outcomes, and incentivized trials, where agents choose between incentive contracts, identify agents' objective and subjective returns to effort. This additional information is valuable in when MTEs are not sufficient for policy simulations, in particular when the beliefs of agents can change.
Introduction
This paper explores experimental evaluation of technologies when outcomes depend significantly on unobserved effort decisions taken by experimental subjects (agents).
1 Even in an idealized randomized controlled trial (RCT), where the experimenter (principal) randomly and independently assigns an arbitrarily large number of agents to the treatment and control groups, unobserved effort limits the information that can be obtained.
2 For example, if a technology's measured returns are low, it is difficult to disentangle whether this is because the true returns are low or because most agents put no effort into using the technology.
Furthermore, given that effort responds to beliefs, and beliefs respond to information, the returns measured by an initial RCT will generally differ from the returns that better informed agents would obtain.
We approach experimental design as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard and adverse selection, where the principal's goal is to maximize information about a technology's returns. The principal chooses a mechanism that assigns each agent to a treatment or control group based on a message from the agent. Each agent then makes an unobserved effort decision based on his beliefs about the treatment, and an outcome is drawn from a distribution that depends on the technology, the agent's treatment status, the agent's effort, and the agent's type. At the end of the experiment the principal observes the message sent, the treatment assigned by the mechanism, and the outcome obtained by each agent.
As the principal focuses on maximizing information, any optimal mechanism must encapsulate and expand the information produced by an RCT. To encapsulate the information produced by an RCT, the mechanisms considered here maintain randomization as an integral part of the experimental design. Thus, these mechanisms inherit many of the robust-1 Throughout the paper we call experimental subjects agents, and call the experimenter the principal. Following usual conventions, we refer to the principal as she and refer to an agent as he.
2 See Duflo et al. (2008a) for a more detailed description of RCTs. Our contribution here is wholly theoretical, but along the lines of Besley and Case (1993) or Banerjee et al. (2005) we approach theory as an important input for empirical work.
ness properties that make RCTs attractive. To expand on this information the mechanisms allow-and provide incentives for-agents to signal details of their type.
All the mechanisms we consider allow agents to select attributes of their experimental treatment at a cost: thus we call them selective trials. We focus on three main attributes of experimental treatment; in all three cases agents make transfers in order to select a particular value of that experimental attribute.
3 First, in selective open trials, agents select a probability of treatment. Second, in selective blind trials, agents once again select a probability of treatment, but treatment status is not revealed until after the agent makes an effort decision. Third, and finally, in incentivized trials, agents select how transfers depend on final outcomes.
Selective open trials, where agents know their treatment status at the time they make their effort decisions, identify at most marginal treatment effects (MTEs: Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005) . These trials offer trade-offs between transfers and the likelihood of treatment. This elicits agents' willingness to pay for certain treatment while keeping assignment conditionally exogenous, which allows the principal to recover MTEs. As RCTs recover the average treatment effect, which can be constructed from MTEs, selective open trials are more informative than randomized controlled trials. Further, we show that, using open trials, it is not possible to elicit more than agents' willingness to pay for certain treatment using open trials.
The additional information elicited by selective open trials comes at the cost of imposing sampling constraints. Incentive compatibility requires agents with higher willingness to pay to be assigned to the treatment group with higher probability. This generates over-sampling at the top and under-sampling at the bottom. In an environment with finitely many agents, these sampling constraints adversely affect the statistical power of selective trials. These sampling losses can be diminished by reducing the slope of the probability-of-treatment menu that agents choose from. While this also weakens the agents' incentives to accurately report their preferences, varying the slope of the sampling profile may allow experimenters to strike an optimal balance between the precision of the messages they obtain and inefficient bias in their sampling profile.
Ultimately, whether the value of additional information outweighs the sampling costs will depend on the principal's beliefs about how closely the value of certain treatment is correlated with unobserved effort. If, as in the empirical work of Cohen and Dupas (2010) and Dupas (2009b) most agents have low values and willingness to pay for treatment is a poor predictor of actual usage, then selective trials may cost useful data points without eliciting particularly valuable information. On the other hand, if, as in the empirical work of Ashraf et al. (forthcoming) , willingness to pay is a good indicator of actual usage, the extra information may be worth the sampling costs. 4 Moreover, even if willingness to pay is a poor indicator of usage, willingness to wait or perform tedious tasks may still be valuable.
By allowing agents to express preferences over more aspects of experimental treatments, we can go beyond MTEs and identify deeper structural parameters. Specifically, by investigating blind trials-a format commonly used in medicine-we can identify an agent's objective and subjective returns to effort. 5 Blind trials can be thought of as randomized controlled trials where an agent's assignment is a lottery over treatment that is resolved only after the agent makes his effort decision. Thus, open trials can be thought of blind trials where the assigned lotteries are degenerate. We show that by allowing agents to ex-4 The idea that a higher price will select individuals with a higher value has been in the economics literature for some time as it is closely related to classic selection models. See Roy (1951) and Oster (1995) .
5 For a brief review of RCTs in medicine see Stolberg et al. (2004) . Jadad and Enkin (2007) provides a more comprehensive review. Selective trials are also closely related to the preference trials used in medicine to assess the ethics of using randomized controlled trials. Preference trials compare outcomes from standard randomized trial, to results from trials in which agents can perfectly select their treatment status. The objective is to determine environments in which letting people choose their preferred treatment does not confound the evaluation of treatment effects. Selective trials highlight that eliciting preferences is not incompatible with randomization and that preferences carry information that facilitate inference from treatment effects. For more on preference trials, see Zelen (1979) ; Flood et al. (1996) ; Silverman and Altman (1996) ; King et al. (2005); Tilbrook (2008) . press preferences over various lotteries one can infer both objective and subjective returns to (subjectively) appropriate effort.
Additionally, we introduce incentivized trials-where agents may receive bonuses depending on outcomes-as blind trials are difficult to implement in many economic environments.
Incentivized trials can also be used to identify objective and subjective returns to effort under two weak assumptions-that the agents' final outcome is verifiable by the principal and that agents have a positive value for the treatment.
The deeper structural parameters obtained through blind and incentivized trials are useful in policy evaluation for three main reasons. First, while MTEs only allow policy simulations when agents' beliefs are fixed. Understanding the agents' subjective and objective returns to effort allows policy simulations on populations with different information. Second, as beliefs are malleable and respond to information, changing beliefs is a useful policy intervention (see, e.g. Thornton (2008) , Dupas (2009a) or Nguyen (2009) ). Once again, identifying agents' subjective and objective returns to effort allow us to determine how changing beliefs will change outcomes. Third, the data that helps an experimenter refine her understanding of true returns (and in particular whether effort matters or not) is also the data that is needed to change agents' beliefs, and hence, their behavior. Thus, selective trials may be useful in both determining the value of a policy affecting beliefs, and generating the data necessary to affect beliefs.
While our approach here is theoretical, we believe these designs can be usefully applied.
Many elements of selective trials have already been used successfully in field studies (see e.g. Ashraf et al., forthcoming; Karlan and Zinman, 2009; Cohen and Dupas, 2010) . Moreover, selective trials can help control for some subversions of experimental protocol discussed in Deaton (forthcoming) . Explicitly allowing the agents to select themselves in and out of treatment may reduce number of agents in the control group who obtain the treatment by other means, as well as the number of agents in the treatment group that refuse to be treated.
6 Further, the principal may use the information revealed in agents' preferences by collecting additional information on agents who expressed a high value for treatment but were assigned to the control group.
We proceed by first developing a simple example illustrating the concerns at the heart of this paper in Section 2, and return to this simple example to summarize our results in Section 7.2. Section 3 defines our framework. Section 4 investigates selective open trials, describes their costs and discusses how to mitigate those costs. Section 5 turns to selective blind trials and shows how they can be used to identify objective and subjective returns to effort. Section 6 extends the analysis to incentivized trials and shows that under reasonable assumptions they can be as informative as blind trials, while keeping treatment status public.
We conclude in Section 7.2 with a discussion of the limitations of, and future directions for, this approach to designing randomized controlled experiments.
An Example
This section uses a very stylized example to make a few simple motivating points. The first is that there are limits to the informativeness of RCTs which cannot be overcome by simply increasing sample size, and that the missing information is generally policy relevant. The second is that simple (open) selective trials can improve on RCTs by letting agents express preferences over treatment in an incentive compatible way. The third is that in general open selective trials do not allow to identify deeper structural parameter and more sophisticated designs will be needed. Section 4 investigates the information generated by, and the potential costs of using open selective trials. We present two more sophisticated designs, respectively using blind and incentivized trials, in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7.1 provides a numerical 6 Note that the percentage of agents rejecting, or opting-in to, treatment is often significant. For example, 45% of the people Dupas and Robinson (2009) opened a savings account for never made a deposit, 72% of the people offered a commitment saving product by Ashraf et al. (2006) rejected it, and in a study of educational vouchers in Columbia, Angrist et al. (2002) find that 25% of those randomly denied a voucher were awarded other scholarships, and 10% of those who were offered vouchers declined them.
example illustrating the inference process usinf data from an RCT, as well as data from more sophisticated selective trials.
To fix ideas, throughout this section we use the example of an experiment evaluating the health effects of a water treatment product.
A Simple Model
While the model in this section is simplified, the notation and concepts will carry through to the more general framework unless specifically noted.
There are infinitely many agents indexed by i ∈ N. For any sequence of random variables
whenever the limit exists. Each agent has a treatment status τ i ∈ {0, 1}. If agent i is in the treatment group, τ i = 1, he is given the water treatment product. Otherwise τ i = 0 and the agent is in the control group. Agent i obtains a final outcome y i ∈ {0, 1}, which can be measured by the principal. In our example y i = 1 indicates that the agent has remained healthy. The probability that an agent remains healthy depends on both treatment and effort:
where e i ∈ [0, 1] is agent i's decision of whether or not to put effort into using the product.
is the component of the technology's return that is common to all agents and q 0 is the baseline likelihood of staying healthy over the study period. Agents have different types t i which characterize their beliefs over returns R. We denote by R t i = E t i R the returns expected by an agent of type t i . The distribution F Rt i of expectations R t i in the population need not be known to the principal or the agents.
7
Throughout the paper, we assume that effort is private and cannot be monitored by the principal. In other words, we assume that all observable dimensions of effort are already controlled for and we focus on those dimensions of effort that are not observable. For instance, in our water treatment example, an experimenter may be able to measure whether the agent has treated water at home, but it is much harder to find out whether the agent brings treated water to drink when he is outside.
8
Given effort e i , agent i's expected utility is given by
where c is the agents' cost of effort. In our example this cost may be the cost of remembering to use the product, the social cost of refusing untreated water, or simply dislike of the taste of treated water. We assume that R L < c < R H .
9
The treatment effect, i.e. the difference in average outcomes between agents who are given the water treatment product and those who are not, is
We contrast two ways of running trials:
1. an RCT, where agents are randomly assigned to the treatment group with probability π;
2. a selective trial where each agent can pay a price p ∈ (0, R H − c) to receive the product 7 We focus on heterogenous beliefs as a source of heterogenous returns because it's a setting were convincingly identifying true returns to treatment would be particularly valuable. Our general framework (see Section 4) allows for general idiosyncratic returns.
8 Still, as Duflo et al. (2010) show, innovative monitoring technologies can be gainfully used in the field, and to the extent that monitoring is possible, it should be done.
9 In this example, allowing c to vary with type does not change any of the results.
with probability π. 10 Agents who do not pay p do not receive the treatment.
The treatment effect is denoted by ∆ RCT for the RCT, and by ∆ ST for the selective trial.
11
The following sections compares the information produced by these protocols.
The Limits of RCTs
In the benchmark RCT design, if agent i is in the treatment group, he chooses to expend effort (e = 1) if and only if R t i ≥ c. Hence, the average treatment effect is
When the distribution of agents' expectations F Rt i is known, then an RCT will identify R. However, in most cases F Rt i is not known, and ∆ RCT provides a garbled signal of the true returns R. If the outcomes of agents in the treatment group are not particularly good compared to agents in the control group, the principal does not know if this is because the water treatment is not particularly useful, or because the agents did not put sufficient effort towards using the treatment.
The Potential Value of Selective Trials
The reason why selective trials are valuable in this environment is that willingness to pay provides a good signal of future usage. Indeed, all agents who pay the price p find it worthwhile to use the water treatment product. Specifically, an agent chooses to participate 10 Note that there is no need for the probability of treatment in the selective trial to be the same as in an RCT; we use the same probability π for notational simplicity. The experimenter could set the probability of treatment to any π ∈ (0, 1].
11 In medical literature, R is referred to as the efficacy of a treatment, and ∆ RCT , which identifies the average treatment effect, is referred to as the effectiveness of the treatment. While effectiveness varies with the beliefs and effort decisions of agents in the experimental population, efficacy does not. 12 It follows that every agent that chooses to participate in the trial will put effort e = 1 given the chance.
Hence, we obtain that
This shows that if an underlying selection process is affecting measurable outcomes, then more informative signals can be generated by making this selection process explicit rather than implicit.
Note that because the behavior of agents is driven by beliefs rather than exogenous, producing data that identifies true returns is clearly policy relevant. Consider for instance the case where true returns to the technology are high, but most agents believe they are low. In that case, an RCT will measure low treatment effects and the data generated by an RCT will not convince agents that they should be putting more effort. In contrast, in this simple model, the data generated selective trial will identify high true returns, lead agents to update their beliefs and significantly drive up adoption.
Still, while this simple example shows that selective trials can be useful to identify true returns, the next subsection shows that in general, the informational gains of using selective trials will be more modest.
The Limits of Selective Trials
In this subsection, we highlight that selective trials are most useful when willingness to pay is a good predictor of future usage, but that this need not always be the case.
We modify our previous example so that returns R to the technology include both baseline 12 We implicitly assume that F Rt i p π + c < 1, i.e. the price p is not too high (and the probability π is not too low), so that a positive measure of agents participate in the experiment.
returns and returns to effort, R = (R b , R e ) ∈ R 2 . In the context of a water treatment product, R b could be the baseline returns of using the water treatment product only when it is convenient to do so and R e the returns to using it more thoroughly (for instance, bringing treated water when away from home). Success rates given effort and treatment status are:
An agent of type t i has expectations (R b,t i , R e,t i ) over returns R = (R b , R e ).
Consider a selective trial such that agents must pay a price p to get in the treatment group with probability π. An agent will choose to participate in the trial if and only if
In contrast, agents put effort if and only if R e,t i ≥ c. Hence the estimated effect of treatment is:
In the example of Section 2.2, willingness to pay was perfectly indicative of intention to use. This is no longer the case here. Indeed, there are two reason why an agent might value the treatment: he believes that a thorough use of the product has high returns (R e,t i is high)-this is the channel emphasized in Section 2.2-or he believes that a casual use of the treatment product is sufficient to obtain high returns and that thoroughness brings little additional returns (R b,t i is high, but R e,t i is low). Hence in this model, agents who are willing to pay because they think baseline returns are high need not be the agents who will actually put effort.
13 As a result the simple selective trials proposed in this section are not sufficient to identify returns.
This leads to a number of questions which we tackle in the remainder of the paper, (with the following answers):
1. What is the information generated by selective trials? (MTEs if trials are open)
2. Does the most informative way to run experiments depend on the experimenter's prior over the underlying environment? (Not if samples are large, or agents are very responsive to incentives)
3. In contexts where willingness to pay is a poor predictor of usage, can more sophisticated designs help get a better handle on agents' beliefs, intentions, and actual effort? (Yes, blind and incentivized selective trials can recover subjective and objective returns to effort.)
Framework
This section generalizes the model of Section 2 to the following environments. There are infinitely many agents, indexed by i ∈ N. 14 Agents have types t from a type space T , which summarize the agents' beliefs as well as their idiosyncratic payoff relevant parameters.
Treatment takes values τ ∈ {0, 1} and agents obtain outcomes y ∈ {0, 1}. 15 Agents make an effort decision e, that now takes value in some set E ⊂ R κ . Note that agents can exert effort whether or not they are in the treatment group. Aggregate returns R to the treatment can now be multidimensional and belong to some set R ⊂ R κ . Let us now expand on some of these features.
13 A particularly perverse example of this would be when agents who value the technology more than p are those who can and will resell it on the black market.
14 We will discuss how our results change with finitely many agents. 15 This assumption greatly simplifies notation but is not essential to our results. See Appendix A for details.
Types. Each agent i has a type t i ∈ T , which includes a belief over aggregate returns R ∈ R, as well as idiosyncratic factors that might affect behavior and outcomes (such as idiosyncratic costs of effort and idiosyncratic returns) and beliefs over such factors. We assume that agents are exchangeable, so that types are i.i.d. draws from some distribution χ ∈ ∆(T ), which is itself a random variable. A profile of types is given by t ∈ T N . Note that it is straightforward to allow for publicly observed characteristics about each agent i.
We omit to do so for the sake on concision.
Outcomes and Success Rates. Agent i obtains an outcome y i ∈ {0, 1}. An agent's objective and subjective likelihoods of success (i.e. y = 1) depend on his type, the aggregate returns to the technology and the agent's effort choice e ∈ E. 16 They are denoted by
where q(R, t, τ, e) is the objective success rate of an agent of type t while q t (τ, e) is the perceived probability of success for an agent of type t. We assume that both q and q t are continuous in e.
Preferences. Given an effort e i , a treatment status τ i , a monetary transfer p i , and a final
For simplicity, we assume that 0 ∈ E and cost c(e i , t) is minimized at e i = 0.
16 In most settings, this effort decision is multidimensional. For instance, in the case of fertilizer, it is not enough for agents to just expend effort spreading fertilizer. As Duflo et al. (2008b) highlight, effort is needed to choose the appropriate seeds to go with the fertilizer, learn how much and when to water the crops, or to learn how much fertilizer gives the highest returns at the lowest cost. In this case it is natural to think of effort as a vector, where the first component corresponds to picking the right seeds, the second to the right amount of fertilizer, the third to properly applying it, etc.
17 Note that if participation is an issue, p i can be negative, and all transfers can be rescaled by a fixed amount. Also, see Appendix A for a treatment of the case where agents have non-quasilinear preferences.
Assignment Mechanisms. We distinguish three ways to assign treatment. 3. Incentivized selective trials are mechanisms G w = (M w , µ w ) where M w is a set of messages and µ w : M w → ∆({0, 1}×R×R) maps messages to a probability distribution over treatment status τ i , a fixed transfer p i from the agent to the principal and a bonus w i from the principal to the agent conditional on y = 1.
Open selective trials are mechanisms
Note that these are single agent mechanisms, so that agent i's final assignment depends only on his message, and not on messages sent by others (see Section 7.2 for a discussion of multi-agent mechanisms). The selective element in all these designs corresponds to the fact that agents can partially select their assignment using messages. We denote by π(m) = Prob(τ = 1|m) the likelihood of being given the treatment given message m. Finally we compare the informativeness of mechanisms as follows.
Informativeness of Mechanisms. Let us denote by a i the assignment given to agent i by whichever mechanism is chosen. The principal observes data
We mostly focus on mechanisms G such that χ-almost surely, every agent i has a dominant message m G (t i ). We say that a mechanism G is at least as informative as a mechanism G (G G) if the data generated by G can be simulated using only data generated by G. This notion corresponds to informativeness in the sense of Blackwell. 18 Note that this definition also applies in the case of finitely many agents.
Open Trials
We begin with the case of open trials, so that an agent is assigned a pair (τ i , p i ). Given effort e and assignment (τ i , p i ), the indirect utility of an agent with type t i is V (τ i , t i ) − p i where,
The optimal effort for type t i given treatment status τ i is denoted by e * (τ i , t i ).
19
As usual, an agent's preferences are determined up to an affine transformation, so we can normalize V (τ i = 0, t i ) = 0. Given this normalization, we will denote by V t i type t i 's value for the treatment. For simplicity we assume that there exists a known value V max ∈ R > 0 such that for all
We also assume that the distribution over values induced by the distribution of types χ admits a density.
Benchmark Results
To begin, we highlight that usual RCTs are special cases of selective trials and provide conditions under which selective trials will be as informative as RCTs. We consider two version of the standard RCT. In the first, denoted by G 0 = (∅, π 0 ), all agents are assigned to the treatment group with the same probability π 0 ∈ (0, 1) and no messages are sent.
In the second, G 0 + = (T, π 0 ), the likelihood of treatment is constant and equal to π 0 , but in addition agents can costless arbitrary messages about their type, for instance through a pre-treatment survey. In both mechanisms agents are not required to make any transfers
there exists a fixed data manipulation procedure h :
19 For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that optimal effort is unique. This will hold whenever q is concave and c is convex in effort. Note that uniqueness of effort only matters to our results in Sections 5 and 6, when we use the Envelope Theorem.
Fact 1 (full support sampling). Consider a mechanism G = (µ, M ) with M finite. If there
Hence, for a mechanism to be as informative as an RCT, it is sufficient that every type have positive probability of being in either the treatment or the control group. Note that this holds only when the sample size is infinite. With a finite number of agents sampling rates would matter for the power of estimators. This is addressed in greater detail in Section 4.4. While the result is fairly straightforward, lack of full support is sometimes an issue with selective trials implemented in the field.
The next fact observes that if we are willing to consider mechanisms in weakly dominant strategies, then benchmark mechanism G 0 + can extract all the information that agents have.
Fact 2 (full revelation with weak incentives). Mechanism G 0 + is such that truthful revelation of one's type is weakly dominant.
The intuition for this result is immediate: as an agent's inclusion in the treatment group is not dependent on the message they send, sending a message which reveals his type is just as good for the agent as sending any other message. Unfortunately, this means that any other message is weakly dominant as well. Hence, although full revelation is possible here, data generated by G 0 + is likely to be unreliable, especially if figuring out one's preferences is costly. Indeed, as Kremer and Miguel (2007) and others have noted, reported beliefs about the returns to a technology are often uncorrelated with willingness to pay. Throughout the rest of the paper, we focus on assignment protocols such that χ-almost every agent has a strictly preferred message.
Information Production in Selective Open Trials
This subsection describes the information produced by selective trials in the case of infinitely many agents and makes two useful points: the first is that there are most informative selective trials independently of beliefs the principal may have over the state R or the distribution χ of types; the second is that no assignment protocol can identify more than an agent's value for treatment, V t .
It is useful to introduce mechanism G * defined as follows. The message space is M = [−1, 1], any agent sending message m is assigned to the treatment group with probability
(independently of the treatment of other agents), and must make a transfer
One can think of agents as having a baseline probability of being in the treatment group equal to 1/2 and deciding by how much they want to deviate from this
baseline. An agent with value V t chooses message m to maximize
This problem is concave in m, and first order conditions yield an optimal message V t /V max , which identifies V t . In addition, note that mechanism G * is such that any agent with value
such that he has positive probability of being either in the treatment or the control group, i.e. G * satisfies the full support assumption of Fact 1. The following result holds.
Proposition 1 (most informative mechanisms). Any mechanism G such that almost every type t has a strictly dominant message is such that m G (t) = m G (V t ) and G G * .
Conversely, whenever G identifies values
satisfies full support (i.e. 0 < inf m π(m) and sup m π(m) < 1), then G * G.
Altogether, this shows that a selective open trial is a most informative trial if and only if
it identifies the agents' willingness to pay and every agent can be assigned to the treatment or control group. Note that again, this result depends on the fact that with infinitely many agents, sampling profiles do not matter. Before we turn to finite sample issues in Section 4.4, it is useful to provide some more details on possible implementations of selective trials.
Implementing Selective Trials
To fix ideas we describe two possible implementation of selective trials. The first is as menus of lotteries. The second uses the framework Becker et al. (1964) .
Implementation as Menus of Lotteries. Pick value thresholds
One can elicit which interval an agent's value belongs to by offering the following menu of lotteries. Set the message space M = {1, · · · , N } and pick any increasing sequence π 1 < π 2 < · · · < π N of sampling rates. Message m ∈ M corresponds to buying the lottery that delivers the treatment with probability π m . We need to specify the price of each lottery to insure that agents classify themselves according to the appropriate value thresholds. This will be the case if and only if
Note that the sequence of transfers is entirely determined by p(1). Let us denote by G π,p the mechanism corresponding to this menu of lotteries.
This result underlines the many degrees of freedom of the experimenter when implementing selective trials as menus of lotteries. The value intervals according to which agents are classified and the rates according to which they obtain treatment are, to a large extent, free parameters. One restriction is that sampling rates are increasing in values. We show in Section 4.4 that this constraint must hold for any strictly incentive compatible mechanism and that it may adversely affect power when sample size is limited.
BDM Implementation. Another common mechanism for eliciting values in experimental settings is that of Becker et al. (1964) . 20 In a BDM mechanism, G BDM , the message space 
The Cost of Running Selective Trials
With infinitely many agents, sampling rates do not affect the informativeness of the data, but this would no longer be the case with finitely many agents. This section shows that strictly incentive compatible selective trials constrain equilibrium sampling rates to be increasing functions of willingness to pay. This generates over-sampling of high value agents and undersampling of low value agents which, as Cohen and Dupas (2010) highlight, may reduce power.
Still we show that whenever agents are very responsive to incentives, these sampling costs can be minimized by reducing the slope of the sampling profile.
Our first result highlights that any incentive compatible mechanism must result in increasing sampling rates.
Proposition 2 (monotonicity). Consider a mechanism G where χ-a.e. player has a strictly optimal message. If agents t and t with V t > V t send messages m G (t) = m G (t ), then it must be that π(m G (t)) > π(m G (t )).
20 For an overview see Bohm et al. (1997) by U (t|m, G) the equilibrium utility of type t sending message m in mechanism G (including transfers).
Proposition 3 (sampling rates and incentives). For any mechanism G = (M, µ) and ρ < ρ in (0, 1), there exists a mechanism G = (M, µ ) such that G G , and for all m ∈ M ,
However, we necessarily have that
Still it is useful to realize that while reducing sampling bias adversely impacts incentives, the principal can improve of experimental designs by making optimal tradeoffs between the two. For instance, this could be achieved by picking an appropriate candidate in the following class of mechanisms. Mechanisms G * λ generalize G * as follows. . Note that λ is the slope of the sampling profile. As λ goes to zero, each agent will be sampled with probability approaching 1 2
, irrespective of the message they send.
Sending message V t /V max is still a dominant strategy for an agent of type t. If an agent with value V sends message V /V max , his loss is
4.5 What can be Inferred from Selective Open Trials?
In this section we relate the previous results to the literature on treatment effects and discuss the extent of the information that can be obtained from selective trials.
Identifying marginal treatment effects. Given a realization of R and χ, definê
the success rate among agents who sent message m and obtained treatment τ . The most informative selective trials are such that m(t) identifies the agent's value V t . Hence, the most informative selective trials identifyq(τ |V ), i.e. success rates as a function of treatment status and willingness to pay. Hence, for every value V , selective trials identifyq(τ = 1|V ) −q(τ = 0|V ), i.e. treatment effects as a function of willingness to pay. This is essentially the marginal treatments effects (MTEs) analyzed by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) . 22 Like MTEs, the data from a selective trial can be used to identify both average and local average treatment effects (see Imbens and Angrist, 1994) .
As Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) show, MTEs are sufficient to simulate treatment effects under policies that change the cost of accessing technologies, but do not change the distribution of types, such as subsidies. However MTEs are not sufficient to simulate treatment effects when the distribution of types in the population changes. This would be the case 22 The identification of MTEs in observational data requires a local instrument, i.e. an instrument that changes the probability of adoption for agents with each possible value (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005) . Selective trials construct these local instruments by randomizing treatment conditional on an agent's value. Note that selective trials also identify higher order moments of the outcome distribution conditional on treatment status and valuation.
if agents' learn, whether on their own, or through information campaigns (e.g. see Oster and Thornton, 2009; Dupas, 2009a; Nguyen, 2009 ). The example of Section 2.4 highlighted this point in an environment where high willingness to pay is not a good signal of intention to use. In that setting, MTEs, do not allow to identify the returns that a fully informed population would obtain when making optimal effort decisions. Thus, both an experimenter and an agent deciding whether or not to adopt a technology need to go beyond MTEs in order to understand deeper parameters of the technology, such as the true returns.
Going beyond MTEs. Can trial design help us to move beyond MTEs and identify deeper parameters? At a very general level, if we insist on trial designs that maintain strict incentives, we will only observe choice behavior which can only identify indirect preferences.
This suggests one cannot do much better than identify MTEs.
23 By enriching the set of choice problems we consider, we can hope to get a better handle on structural determinants of behavior and outcomes. We quickly discuss the potential gains from eliciting preferences over larger sets of goods. Sections 5 and 6 consider choice problems over uncertain allocations as well choices over contracts.
The trade-off identified in Section 4, between identifying willingness to pay (and potentially getting a handle on unobserved effort) and the loss in power due to sampling bias usefully informs the recent debate on charging for treatment in RCTs run in a development context. 24 If, as in Ashraf et al. (forthcoming) , willingness to pay is correlated with product usage, then eliciting willingness to pay might be quite useful in understanding the true returns of a product. If instead, as in the case of Cohen and Dupas (2010) , most agents have low values and willingness to pay is not a very good predictor of actual use, the loss of power due to oversampling of high value types may become problematic: valuable data points are 23 Higher order moments of the outcome distribution conditional on treatment status and valuation are identified by selective trials, and may be useful to researchers.
24 Based on some of the studies cited above, the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab recommends against charging prices for health technologies. For more details see http://www.povertyactionlab.org/ policy-lessons/health/pricing-health-products. lost to acquire only marginally useful information.
25 As Proposition 3 highlights, this problem can be mitigated to some extent by reducing the slope of the sampling profile. An other way to resolve this problem is to offer the agent choice problems that are more informative than tradeoffs between money and treatment. For instance, if most of the heterogeneity in willingness to pay is driven by wealth and credit constraints, then eliciting willingness to wait or willingness to perform tedious task may be a better indicator of future usage than willingness to pay. If this is the case, selective trials can and should be designed based on such tradeoffs. The intuition of these trials is largely the same, but requires extending our approach to the case where agents have non-quasilinear preferences. See Appendix A for details.
Selective Blind Trials
We extend our approach to situations where agents are uncertain about their treatment status when they make their effort choice, as in the blind trials commonly used in medicine.
These trials allow to elicit agents' preferences over not just final treatment status but over unresolved lotteries on treatment status. As this section shows, this allows one to recover much more information about the beliefs of agents and how those beliefs interact with treatment. In particular, blind selective trials can recover agents' objective and subjective returns to effort.
While blind trials are very prominent in medical research, they are often difficult to implement in economic environments. This is mostly due to the fact that coming up with convincing placebo treatments is difficult, and even when placebos are available, their use can raise delicate ethical concerns. However, as we show in Section 6 the insights developed for blind trials can be extended to settings where treatment is public by using incentivized trials.
25 As Dupas (2010) shows, this can also hinder social learning.
Framework and Basic Results
Formally, blind trials select a probability of being in the treatment group, φ, which is common knowledge, and an actual treatment status, τ , which is known only to the principal. Thus, the pair (τ, φ) can be thought of as a full description of an agent's treatment. This class of selective blind trials nests both open trials (where φ ∈ {0, 1}) and standard blind trials where φ is fixed.
Assignment Mechanisms. As noted in Section 3, selective blind trials are mechanisms
. Given a message m, µ assigns the agent a likelihood of being treated φ ∈ [0, 1] which is known to the agent, and a transfer p ∈ R. An actual treatment status τ ∈ {0, 1} is drawn according to φ.
Utility and Effort. An agent of type t's value for uncertain treatment status φ is:
V t (φ) = max e∈E φq t (τ = 1, e)+(1−φ)q t (τ = 0, e) u(y = 1, t)−u(y = 0, t) +u(y = 0, t)−c(e, t).
The corresponding effort decision is e * (φ, t). We assume that for every type t, e * (φ, t) is interior and differentiable in φ.
26 Consistent with earlier notation we maintain V t (φ = 0) = 0.
Note that V t (φ = 1) = V t is the agent's value for treatment in an open trial.
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We first highlight that blind trials can at most elicit indirect preferences over uncertain We make this assumption to apply a simple version of the Envelope Theorem. The framework of Milgrom and Segal (2002) can be used to extend our results under weaker conditions.
27 Throughout the section, we keep φ as an argument of V t (φ) for the purpose of clarity. We denote the value of V t (φ) at φ = φ 0 by V t (φ = φ 0 ). according to distributions Φ and F p . If m(φ) ≥ p, the agent is assigned (φ, p). Otherwise, the agent is assigned (0, 0). It is straightforward that m G bBDM (t) = V t (φ). In addition the following result holds.
Proposition 4 (informativeness of selective blind trials). Any strictly incentive compatible blind mechanism G is such that m G (t) = m G (V t (φ) ) and G G bBDM . Further, if G identifies V t (φ) and satisfies inf m,φ µ(φ|m) > 0 then G bBDM G.
Blind trials have two distinct advantages over open trials. First, blind trials can help
decorrelate an agent's behavior and treatment status. As detailed in the next subsection, this will allow the principal to get a handle on whether empirical success rates are being driven by the agent's behavior or by the treatment itself. Second, by identifying V t (φ), blind trials provide useful information about an agent's intended behavior and his perceived success rate.
The Value of Decorrelating Beliefs and Treatment Status
Changes in success rates due to treatment come from two sources: the effect of the treatment itself, and the effect of behavioral changes associated with treatment. In an open trial behavioral changes are perfectly correlated with changes in treatment status, whereas in a blind trial it is possible to decorrelate these two effects.
Data from an open trial allows identification of treatment effects conditional on the value function of an agent with type t, V t (φ), and for agents with the same value for φ = 1:
Open trials allow us to identify q(τ = 1, φ = 1|V ) and q(τ = 0, φ = 0|V ), which are sufficient to compute marginal treatment effects,
Blind trials allow the identification of both of the above quantities, as well as, q(τ = 1, φ = 0|V ) and q(τ = 0, φ = 1|V ). These four quantities together allow us to separate the marginal treatment effect (and thus, the average treatment effect) into the effect of treatment and the effect of behavioral change. When an agent of type t has belief φ = 1 he chooses the effort e * (t, τ = 1) that he would pick if he knew he was being treated, regardless whether he actually receives treatment. Similarly, an agent of type t that has belief φ = 0 chooses the effort e * (t, τ = 0) that he would pick if he knew he was not being treated, regardless of his actual treatment status. 28 Thus, ∆ B = q(τ = 0, φ = 1|V ) − q(τ = 0, φ = 0|V ) is the effect of behavior change alone, while ∆ T = q(τ = 1, φ = 0|V ) − q(τ = 0, φ = 0|V ) corresponds to the effect of treatment alone. Furthermore, if the quantity
is positive, then treatment and behavioral changes are complimentary in producing successful outcomes. If, instead, (7) is negative, this suggests that there is a negative interaction between treatment and the perceived optimal behavior of agents conditional on treatment.
It is important to note that ∆ B measures the effect of an agent's perceived optimum behavior given φ = 0. Given that an agent's perception of the optimal level of effort may be far from the actual optimum, it is important to get a handle on what the agent's beliefs are, and how those beliefs influence his effort decision. As the following subsection shows, this is precisely what information on V t (φ) can provide.
28 Of course, in a more dynamic setting, the agent will use ex-interim outcomes to try to determine his treatment status, and modify his behavior accordingly (on this topic, see Philipson and Desimone, 1997; Philipson and Hedges, 1998 ). As we discuss in Section 7.2, it is possible but delicate to elicit preferences over treatment at different points in time. A full exploration of this question is left for future work.
The Value of Eliciting Preferences V t (φ)
By examining the revealed preferences V t (φ) of an agent, or a group of agents with the same revealed preferences, we can get a handle on how agents perceive the answers to many of the questions addressed above using data on outcomes. That is to say, we can discover the agent's subjective value of treatment and behavior change.
A straightforward examination of V t (φ) reveals whether an agent believes that effort, or behavior, has the ability to change the effect of treatment.
Proposition 5 (a test of "intent to change behavior").
If e * (φ = 0, t) = e * (φ = 1, t), then for all φ , V t (φ ) = φ V t (φ = 1).
If e * (φ = 0, t) = e * (φ = 1, t), then for all φ ∈ (0, 1), V t (φ ) < φ V t (φ = 1).
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Recall that V t (φ = 0) is normalized to zero. Then the first part of the proposition comes from the fact that the agent does not believe changing effort will change his probability of success. That is, he believes the effect of treatment is independent of behavior, and thus, his expected return to being treated with probability φ is simply φ times the value of certain treatment, V t (φ = 1). When the agent believes effort is important in determining outcomes, the difference φ V t (φ = 1) − V t (φ ) corresponds to the agent's perceived loss of value to not being able to tailor his effort to his actual treatment status.
But what does the agent believe the returns to optimal behavior are, and how do these correspond to the agent's perceived returns to treatment? Using the envelope theorem, we can get a handle on perceived returns to treatment for the agent's perceived optimal level of effort for any value of φ .
Proposition 6 (identifying perceived returns to effort). For any value φ , we have that
29 The statement of the proposition implicitly assumes that e * is unique. See the proof for a statement of the resut when this does not hold.
In particular, we can compute the ratio of perceived treatment effects at φ = 1 and φ = 0:
This is the ratio of subjective treatment effects given subjectively appropriate effort to subjective treatment effect given status quo (no treatment) effort.
Defining the subjective versions of the quantities in (7) as ∆
, and so on, we can use (8) to perform a similar analysis-but over subjective quantities-to that enabled by (7). In particular, if ∆ T t > 0, that is, the agent believes that treatment has a positive effect independent of effort, then it is easy to show ∆ M T E t − ∆ (8) is greater than one. The same analysis that follows (7) applies, with the difference that we are now dealing with subjective returns from the agent's point of view (and before the experiment is run), rather than objective returns from data.
A few points about placebo effects are in order here, although we leave a full treatment to future work. First, if the indirect preferences of a group of agents indicates that they do not intend to change their behavior (via Proposition 5), yet exhibit positive behavioral effects (∆ B > 0), this indicates that the improvement due to a higher probability of uncertain treatment is not conscious. Second, it is possible to implement a mechanism which (honestly) tells the principal a different probability of uncertain treatment than the agent.
This allows independent variation in the principal's and agents' beliefs about the probability of treatment, which may allow for the separate identification of the effect of the principal's beliefs and the agents' beliefs.
Selective Incentivized Trials
We now turn to showing how quantities similar to those identified by blind trials can be identified without a placebo. We accomplish this with an incentivized trial which allows agents to express preferences over contracts.
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Framework and Basic Results
Assignment Mechanisms: As noted in Section 3, an incentivized trial is a mechanism
. Given a message m, µ(m) is used to draw a treatment status τ , a fixed transfer p, as well as a bonus w transferred in the event of success (which may be negative). The pair (τ, w) can be thought of as an aggregate treatment.
Utility and Effort:
The agents' indirect preferences over contracts (τ, w), denoted by
, are given by
We denote by e * (τ, w, t) the induced effort level, and maintain the normalization V t (τ = 0, w = 0) = 0.
Insurance: A specific value w that will be useful is w 0 ≡ −[u(y = 1, t) − u(y = 0, t)]. When the agent receives a positive baseline transfer for participating in the experiment, the negative bonus w 0 essentially provides the agent with insurance over the outcome y. Alternatively, w 0 could be interpreted as a positive transfer to the agent in the event of failure. Under either interpretation, regardless of his treatment status the agent will put in the effort that minimizes the cost of his effort. It is useful to think of this as zero or no effort. Note that it is not possible, in general, to induce this level of effort using open or blind trials.
We first proceed by assuming that w 0 is known to the principal. At the end of the section we show w 0 can be inferred from V t (τ, w) under fairly mild conditions. Alternatively, since w 0 is the monetary value of success, it could be calibrated from other data.
What can be Inferred from Incentivized Trials?
It is straightforward to extend Propositions 1 and 4. More specifically, an incentivized selective trial G that is strictly incentive compatible identifies at most V t (τ, w) . Furthermore, G is a most informative incentivized trial if it identifies V t (τ, w) and, given any message, puts positive density on all possible outcomes (τ, w). As before, the (by now) familiar BDM mechanism can be adapted to identify V t (τ, w). Note that the information produced by incentivized trials nests that produced by open trials. In particular,
Incentivized trials recover empirical success rates as a function of treatment, incentives and preferences, q(τ, w|V t (τ, w)). Success rate q(τ, w|V t (τ, w)) will be independent of w if effort does not matter for outcomes or incentives do not affect effort provision.
Together, the subjective and objective data generated by selective incentivized trials will again allow us to decorrelate treatment and effort, as well as infer an agent's perceptions over success rates.
Identifying Objective Returns to Effort: As a contract with transfer w 0 ≡ −[u(y = 1, t) − u(y = 0, t)] provides the agent with perfect insurance, so the optimal effort given this insurance will be the same regardless of treatment status. With knowledge of w 0 , the empirical success rates q(τ, w|V t (τ, w)) for τ ∈ {0, 1} and w ∈ {w 0 , 0} allow us to identify two quantities similar to those discussed in Section 5.2:
Note that returns to treatment are measured here when the agent puts in no effort e * (τ, w 0 , t), rather than at effort level e * (φ=0) = e * (τ=0, w=0, t) as in Section 5.2, and returns to effort are measured as the difference between success rates when the agent puts in his perceived optimal effort given treatment and zero effort. Moreover, incentivized trials allow measurement of the returns to effort over the range of effort from zero to perceived optimal effort given treatment.
Despite these differences, these quantities can be used to look for complementarities between treatment and effort as in blind trials.
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Identifying Subjective Returns to Effort: Indirect preferences V t (τ, w) give us a handle on subjective returns to effort.
Proposition 7 (identifying subjective success rates).
Given knowledge of w 0 , this allows us to compute subjective returns to treatment and appropriate effort:
Perceived Returns to Treatment = q t (τ = 1, w = w 0 |V t (τ, w)) − q t (τ = 0, w = w 0 |V t (τ, w))
Perceived Returns to Effort = q t (τ = 1, w = 0|V t (τ, w)) − q t (τ = 1, w = w 0 |V t (τ, w)).
Note that if perceived returns to effort are low, this may indicate that an agent plans on putting little or no effort into using the technology. The principal could use this information in deciding which agents' usage to monitor more closely.
The monetary equivalent of the effort cost that agents are incurring to obtain the per-31 Under some assumptions it is possible to identify wages which induce the same effort levels as blind trials: e * (φ = 0) and e * (φ = 1) = e * (τ = 1, w = 0, t) when τ = 1 and τ = 0, respectively. By manipulating (9) it can be shown that if there exists a function f such that q t (τ = 1, e) = f (q t (τ = 0, e)) for e close to e * (which is always satisfied if e is uni-dimensional), the transfer w that satisfies:
induces effort e * (φ = 1) = e * (τ = 1, w = 0, t) when τ = 0. A similar condition holds when determining the wage such that e * (φ = 0) = e * (τ = 0, w = 0, t) when τ = 1.
ceived return to effort above can be obtained by rearranging (9):
A disparity between principal and agent's belief about the costs of effort needed to increase success rates may indicate either that the agent is not putting in appropriate effort, or that the principal may not be aware of certain shortcuts the agent has access to.
Identifying w 0 . With some additional assumptions, it is possible to identify w 0 = u(0, t)− u(1, t).
Fact 5. If outcome y = 1 yields strictly greater utility than y = 0: u(y = 1, t) > u(y = 0, t) and agents perceive treatment to always be beneficial:
Indeed, whenever the agent has less than perfect insurance, the agent values the treatment as it allows him to more cheaply achieve desirable success rates. When insurance is perfect, then the agent has no value for the treatment. Note that our assumptions rule out cases where the agent believes he may be hurt by the treatment, as well as environments where the agent only values treatment for other reasons than its impact on outcomes.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion, we provide a fully worked-out numerical example detailing the inference process starting with treatment effect data from a standard RCT, an enriching those with data form an open selective trial and and incentivized selective trial. In addition we discuss directions for future work, including practical difficulties in implementing selective trials, as well as natural extensions of our current designs such as dynamic and multi-agent mechanisms.
A Detailed Numerical Example
We illustrate the respective informational value of RCTs, open selective trials and incentivized selective trials, using the following simple example.
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Returns R are two dimensional, with R = (R b , R e ). Success rates are such that q(τ = 0, e) = 0 and q(τ = 1, e) = R b + eR e .
where e ∈ R is the agent's effort provision. An agent with type t has expectations R t = (R b,t , R e,t ) and maximizes E t [y] − c(e) where c(e) = e+e 2 2
.
Given an incentivized trial with bonus w, the agent's effort is e * (w, t) = R e,t (1 + w) − 1/2.
Hence, his objective success rate and value for treatment are given by
To illustrate the inference process we consider the case where R e ∈ {1/2, 1}, R b ∈ {0, 1/2}, R e,t ∈ 1 2
, 1 and R b,t ∈ {1/8, 1/4}.
Inference from an RCT. An RCT identifies the average treatment effect, which in this case boils down to q = R b + R e (R e,t − 1/2). For our numerical model, this can be represented 32 We use incentivized trials because these are more naturally adapted to economic applications. The same information could be obtained from running blind selective trials.
by the following matrix R e = 1/2 R e = 1 R e,t = 1/2 R e,t = 1 R e,t = 1/2 R e,t = 1
Whenever q ∈ {1/4, 3/4, 1} this data identifies the underlying returns (R b , R e ). However treatment effects q ∈ {0, 1/2} are consistent with multiple true returns. In particular a treatment effect q = 1/2 is consistent with returns (R b = 1/2, R e = 1/2), (
and (R b = 0, R e = 1).
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Inference from a selective open trial. In addition to treatment effects q, a selective open trial identifies the agent's willingness to pay for treatment
We illustrate the value of that additional information in the case where q = 1/2. This is consistent with the following combinations of true returns R b and R e and expected return to effort R e,t : (R b = 1/2, R e = 1/2, R e,t = 1/2), (R b = 1/2, R e = 1, R e,t = 1/2) and (R b = 0, R e = 1, R e,t = 1). Conditional on q = 1/2, possible values V t as a function of expectations R b,t are given by the following table:
. If V t = 3/8 the data from selective trials implies that R e,t = 1. From this we know that the 33 Note that the beliefs of agents may be self confirming. For instance an agent who believes that effort has no returns will infer from data q = 1/2 that indeed effort has no returns and that R b,t = 1/2. Such self-confirming beliefs are frequent in the experimentation and social learning literatures. See for instance Rothschild (1974) ; Banerjee (1992) ; Bikhchandani et al. (1992) . See Fudenberg and Levine (1993) for an analysis of self-confirming beliefs in strategic situations. agent must have been putting effort R e,t = 1/2. Since the treatment effect is q = 1/2 (rather than 3/4) the only consistent returns are R b = 0 and R e = 1. If V t = 1/8, there remains uncertainty since the data is consistent with both (R b = 1/2, R e = 1/2) and (R b = 1/2, R e = 1). However we are able to rule out the case where R b = 0 and R e = 1. Finally if V t = 1/4, the data is consistent with all three configurations (R b = 1/2, R e = 1/2), (R b = 1/2, R e = 1) and (R b = 0, R e = 1). We now highlight how running an incentivized trial allows us to identify exactly the state of the world.
Inference from an incentivized trial. Incentivized trials give us access to incentivized treatment effects q(w) = R b + R e (R e,t (1 + w) − 1/2) as well as preferences over incentive
We can identify R e,t from equation
e,t − 1/16 since its left hand side is computable from data. In turn we obtain
Given R e,t , we can identify true returns R e from the fact that
= R e R e,t . Finally we obtain R b from the fact that R b = q(w = 1) − R e (R e,t − 1/2).
Altogether, this allows us to identify both the true returns (R b , R e ) and the agents' beliefs (R b,t , R e,t ). Note that from an experimental perspective, this can be achieved by eliciting preferences and outcomes for w = 0 and an other value w = 0 small. This relies on the fact that there are only four unknown parameters. Identification of more flexible models would require data at additional values of w.
Directions for Future Research
Implementation Issues: There are three broad issues that need to be tackled to correctly implement selective trials. The first is that appropriate local knowledge is needed to pick trade-offs that are informative of the agents' intended behavior. For instance, as we highlight in Section 4, when agents are credit constrained, monetary trade-offs may be less informative than willingness to wait or willingness to perform tedious tasks.
A second, more significant, difficulty is that boundedly rational agents might not play dominant strategies, so that the messages they send are not good signals of their actual values. This issue can be contained by giving the agents multiple opportunities to learn how to play the mechanism used to elicit their valuation before they are asked to express preferences over treatment. In addition, as Section 4 highlights, there are many possible implementations of selective trials (for instance as a BDM mechanism, or as a menu of lotteries), some of which may be more appropriate than others in the field.
The third, and most delicate, implementation issue is that if the act of making choices changes agents' preferences, selective trials may introduce additional noise. 34 For instance, imagine that when agents express a strong desire for treatment but do not get it, they will attempt to obtain treatment by other means, which they would not do if valuation was never elicited. In this setting, running a selective trial may prevent the experimenter from building an appropriate control group.
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Extension to Dynamic Mechanisms: Throughout the paper, we focus on mechanisms which allow us to elicit the agents' preferences only once. Note that this could occur either before or after the agent has been exposed to the technology. In environments where agents learn over the course of the experiment, it may be valuable to elicit the agents' preferences over time. 36 Consider a technology that requires sustained effort to yield returns (for example: anti-depressants with delayed effects, technologies exhibiting significant learningby-doing, and so on). Eliciting preferences over time may improve inference by helping to distinguish agents exhibiting consistent motivation throughout the treatment from agents whose motivation drops in the middle of the trial. However, eliciting preferences over time 34 See Keller et al. (1993) or Bohm et al. (1997) for critiques of BDM mechanisms when agents are behavioral.
35 Of course, in a standard open RCT, agents in the control group who highly value the treatment may try to obtain it. A selective trial would decrease noise by identifying these agents and treating them with higher probability.
36 Philipson and Desimone (1997) ; Philipson and Hedges (1998); Scharfstein et al. (1999) ; Chan and Hamilton (2006) take a different approach to this problem by incorporating the information from observable non-compliance into econometric models in order to estimate more accurate treatment effects. may be complicated when anticipated treatment status changes current effort provision. In particular, if an agent is promised treatment in future periods to induce a particular current effort level, then it becomes impossible to elicit preferences in the future without breaking this promise. We leave the analysis of such mechanisms and their limitations for future work.
Extension to multi-agent mechanisms. The mechanisms considered in this paper are all single-agent mechanisms as an agent's assignment depends only on the message he sends and not on the messages sent by others. This allows us to identify the agent's preferences as well as his beliefs over his own treatment effects and returns to effort. Considering multiagent mechanisms, in which assignment depends on the messages sent by others, can allow us to identify the agent's beliefs about: others values, others' success rates, and so on. For instance, one may allow agents to place bets over the willingness to pay expressed by others.
Eliciting beliefs over others' value may be useful if there are externalities between agents, as in Miguel and Kremer (2004) , or to get a tighter handle on social learning. For example, if we observe that most agents have low value for the technology but believe that others have high value for the technology, this suggests a failure in social learning, provides us the means to correct it. Indeed, if most agents do not put effort in using the technology but believe that others do, then agents interpret poor treatment effect on others as a signal that even with high effort the technology does not yield returns. Providing the agents' with actual data on others' willingness to pay corrects this inference mistakes and may increase experimentation.
Again, we leave more in depth analysis of such mechanisms to future work.
A Extensions
A.1 General Outcome Space
Most of the paper's results extend directly to the case where y takes values in a general outcome space Y and is distributed according to some density function f y (R, τ, e, t). We denote by f y,t (τ, e) ≡ R f y (R, τ, e, t)dt(R) the subjective distribution of returns from the perspective of an agent of type t. Values simply go from being sums of two terms to being integrals. The only change is that incentive contracts are now functions w : Y → R. Indeed, we have that
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 extend directly with these generalized value functions.
Propositions 6 and 7 which identify subjective returns differ as follows. Proposition 7 which deals with the case of incentivized trials is the easiest to extend. Indeed, we have that
which is a direct extension of Proposition.
Proposition 6 which deals with blind trials is harder to extend because we only have a one-dimensional instrument, φ ∈ [0, 1] to identify an entire function f y,t rather than one parameter q t . We now have that
which corresponds to a utility weighted subjective treatment effect given subjectively appropriate effort under belief φ.
A.2 Eliciting Preferences under Non-Quasilinear Utility
The approach developed in this paper largely extends to the case where preferences are not quasilinear although we must consider slightly different mechanisms. We now consider utility taking the form u(y, e, p, t) where y ∈ Y , e ∈ E, p is a monetary outcome and t is the agent's type.
In the case of open trials, indirect preferences take the following form:
u(y, e, p, t)f y,t (τ, e)dy.
Say we want to elicit preference over a range (τ, p) ∈ {0, 1} × [p, p]. We assume for simplicity that for all such (τ, p), 
otherwise. In this setting it is dominant for the agent to send message m = V t . Similar mechanisms allow us to identify indirect preferences in the case of blind and incentivized trials.
Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 extend directly with these generalized value functions. Again, extending Propositions 6 and 7 requires some more work. Proposition 6 which identifies subjective returns to effort using blind trials extends as is when y ∈ {0, 1}, and extends according to equation (10) when y takes values in a general outcome set Y . Proposition 7 extends as is when preferences are separable in money, i.e. when u(y, e, p, t) = u 0 (y, e, t) + u 1 (p, t). When preferences are not separable in money, incentivized trials allow us to identify 
Proof of Fact 2:
Since an agent's outcome is independent of the message she sends, any strategy is weakly dominant, in particular truthful revelation of her own type.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The proof of the first claim is very similar to that of Fact 1.
Consider a mechanism G = (M, µ G ) such that every player has a strictly dominant strategy.
An agent with value V (t i ) chooses a message m i to solve
This problem is entirely defined by player i's value V (t i ). Since a.e. player has a strictly optimal message, this problem has a unique solution for a.e. value. Hence we obtain that m G (V (t i )) ≡ arg max m∈M E µ (τ i |m i = m)V (t i ) − E µ (p i |m i = m) is a well defined mapping.
We now construct a mapping h : D → ∆(D) such that the data generated by G can be simulated from data generated by G * using mapping h. For simplicity we describe the mapping h in the case where M is finite. Given d G * , h(d G * ) is generated iteratively as follows.
First, we break down the basic data d G * in 2 × card M subsets, according to treatment τ and the message m G (V ) corresponding to the value declared by the agent. Formally, for all m ∈ M and τ ∈ {0, 1}, we define (d σm,τ (i) G * ) i∈N the ordered subsequence such that for all i, m G (V σm,τ (i) ) = m and τ σm,τ (i) = τ . Since (V − V max )/V ∈ (0, 1), all these subsamples are infinite. Hence, σ m,τ can be chosen to be strictly increasing from N → N. We use these subsamples to simulate data d G .
Let us denote h(d G * ) = (d 
For k < k, this last condition is equivalent to V ≥ max k <k {(p k − p k )/(π k − π k )}, which in turn is equivalent to V > V k−1 . Similarly, for k > k, equation (11) is equivalent to V k > V .
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Fact 4:
The fact that the BDM mechanism elicits values is well-known. Since F p has full support over [−V max , V max ], assignment to treatment also satisfies full-support and the second part of Proposition 1 implies that G BDM is a most informative mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 2: Agents of type t and t are such that V t > V t and m G (t) = m G (t ).
Denote π(m) = µ G (τ = 1|m) and p m = E µ G (·|m) p. It must be that
π(m G (t ))V t − p m G (t ) > π(m G (t ))V t − p m G (t ) .
Adding the two inequalities yields that [π(m G (t)) − π(m G (t ))](V t − V t ) > 0, which implies that π(m G (t)) > π(m G (t )).
Proof of Proposition 3:
We begin with the first assertion. Given mechanism G = (M, µ),
we define mechanism G = (M, µ ) as follows:
∀m ∈ M, µ (m) =          τ = 0, p = 0 with probability ρ µ(m) with probability ρ − ρ τ = 1, p = 0 with probability ρ Clearly mechanism G is strategically equivalent to mechanism G. The proof that G G is omitted since it is simple and essentially identical to that of Fact 1.
We now turn to the second assertion. Consider two messages m 1 and m 2 respectively sent by types with values V 1 and V 2 . We must have that Let us denote by If arg max e∈E V t (τ = 1, e) ∩ arg max V t (τ = 0, e) = ∅, the inequality is an equality and, since we normalized V t (φ = 0) = 0 we obtain that V t (φ ) = φ V t (φ = 1).
Inversely, if arg max e∈E V t (τ = 1, e) ∩ arg max V t (τ = 0, e) = ∅, the inequality is strict and V t (φ ) < φ V t (φ = 1).
Proof of Proposition 6:
The result follows directly from applying the Envelope Theorem to equation (6).
Proof of Proposition 7:
The result follows directly from applying the Envelope Theorem to equation (9).
Proof of Fact 5: Whenever w = w 0 , the agent is perfectly insured and V t (τ = 1, w) = V t (τ = 0, w) since access to the technology is valuable only in so far as it affects outcomes.
We now show that whenever w > w 0 , V t (τ = 1, w) > V t (τ = 0, w). The agent's value is V t (τ, w) = max e∈E q t (τ, e)[u(1, t) − u(0, t) + w] + u(0, t) − c(e, t).
Let e * 0 be the agent's optimal effort level if τ = 0. Since condition (10) holds, there exists e 1 such that c(e 1 , t) ≤ c(e * 0 , t) and q t (τ = 1, e 1 ) > q t (τ = 0, e * 0 ). Since w > w 0 = u(0, t) − u(1, t), it follows that the agent gets strictly higher value under configuration (τ = 1, e 1 ) than under configuration (τ = 0, e * 0 ). This concludes the proof.
